



# The Cross-Sectional Distribution of Fund Skill Measures

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# Outline

- **Motivation & Contribution**
- **The Skill Measures**
- **The Non-Parametric Approach**
- **Data Description**
- **Empirical Results**

# Motivation

- **Extensive literature on performance**
  - Ample evidence of negative net alphas
    - (i) Average: Jensen(68), Elton et al.(93)
    - (ii) Distribution: Barras et al. (10), Harvey & Liu(18a)
- **Far less is known about skill**
  - Usually: bad performance=unskilled...
  - But skill and performance are very different
  - Skill: viewpoint of funds
    - Do they create value via their investment/trading skills?
  - Performance: viewpoint of investors
    - Do they receive some of this value (bargaining power)?

# Motivation

- **In this paper, we focus on skill**
  - Estimate the entire distribution of mutual fund skill
  - Beyond the average: capture heterogeneity in skill
- **Novelty: we use a non-parametric approach**
  - No parametric structure imposed on the distribution
  - Bias adjustment: infer *true* skill from estimated skill
- **Why is a non-parametric approach important?**
  - (i) Avoid the challenge of specifying the skill distribution
  - (ii) Allow to examine jointly multiple skill measures
    - In contrast with std parametric/Bayesian approaches

# Contribution

- **We jointly examine four skill measures**
  - For the entire universe of US equity funds
- **The two dimensions of fund skill**

Investment versus trading skills

  - (i) First dollar(fd) alpha: ability to detect trading opportunities
  - (ii) Size coefficient: ability to override capacity constraints
- **Aggregating the two skill dimensions**

Value added (profits) from exploiting skill

  - (i) Lifecycle: profits over the entire lifecycle (different size)
  - (ii) Steady state: profits after reaching the average size

# Contribution

- **Main results: the two skill dimensions**
  - Funds are skilled at detecting profitable trades  
...but are unskilled at resisting capacity constraints
    - For 85% of funds: (i) fd alpha>0, (ii) size coeff.>0  
Average fd alpha: 3.4% per year  
Average size coeff.: 1.4% per year for  $1\sigma$
    - Strong heterogeneity + highly non-normal  
Looking at the average not sufficient
  - Both skill measures are positively correlated
    - Importance of aggregating them

# Contribution

- **Main results: aggregating the skill dimensions**
  - Funds earn large profits from their skills
    - For 70% of the funds: value added > 0
      - Average (lifecycle): 1.9 mio. per year
      - Average (steady state(ss)): 7.1 mio. per year
    - Strong heterogeneity + highly non-normal
  - Profits are not far from level predicted by theory
    - Steady state value added: 2/3 of optimal value added
  - Overall interpretation for funds
    - Skill + bargaining power over investors

# Contribution

- **Literature on performance (net alpha)**
  - Average: Carhart(97), Elton et al.(93), Jensen(68), Kosowski et al.(06), Pastor and Stambaugh(02)
  - Distribution: Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers(10), Ferson and Chen(18), Harvey and Liu(18a), Jones and Shanken(05)
- **Literature on fund skill**
  - Berk and van Binsbergen(15), Grinblatt and Titman(89), Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor(15), Wermers(00)
- **Literature on time-varying fund returns**
  - Chen et al.(04), Harvey and Liu(18b), Kasperczyk et al.(14), Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor(15,17)



# The Skill Measures

## 1) The two skill dimensions

- Gross alpha-size relation (Berk-Green (BG) model):

$$\alpha_{i,t} = a_i - b_i q_{i,t-1}$$

- The first dollar(fd) alpha
  - Ability to detect profitable trades
  - “Paper” return: no drag of real world implementation
- The size coefficient
  - Ability to override capacity constraints
  - Execution costs of trading large orders
  - Fund-specific (departs from previous work)

# The Skill Measures

## 2) Aggregating the two skill dimensions

- Value added: profits from exploiting skill
  - Like monopolist rent: markup price x quantity
- Lifecycle value added (over the fund lifecycle):

$$va_{i,l} = E[\alpha_{i,t}q_{i,t-1}] = a_i q_{1,i} - b_i q_{2,i}$$

$$\text{with } q_{1,i} = E[q_{i,t-1}] \text{ and } q_{2,i} = E[(q_{i,t-1})^2]$$

- Steady state value added (at average size  $q_{1,i}$ ):

$$va_{i,ss} = E[\alpha_{i,t}]E[q_{i,t-1}] = a_i q_{1,i} - b_i (q_{1,i})^2$$

- We have  $va_{i,ss} > va_{i,l}$  as long as  $b_i > 0$

# The Non-Parametric Approach

## ▪ Overview

- Allow for the estimation of the distribution of all skill measures  $m_i = \{a_i, b_i, va_{i,l}, va_{i,ss}\}$ 
  - Applies to density, cumulative function, moments (e.g., mean, variance, skewness), quantiles
  - Focus for the presentation: density
- Main challenge: inference of the *true* measures  $m_i$  based on the estimated ones  $\hat{m}_i$ 
  - Error-in-Variable (EIV) bias

# The Non-Parametric Approach

- **Benefits (vs Bayesian/parametric approaches)**
  - Immune to misspecification errors
    - No assumption on the shape of the *true* distribution
  - Joint analysis of all four skill measures
    - No inconsistencies/curse of dimensionality
  - Simple and fast (like an histogram)
    - No Gibbs sampling, EM algorithm
  - Asymptotic theory (double asymptotics)
    - Derivation of asymptotic distribution/bias of the different estimators

# The Non-Parametric Approach

## 1) Estimation of the skill measures

- Times-series regression for each fund (gross return)

$$r_{i,t} = a_i - b_i q_{i,t-1} + \beta'_i f_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad i = 1, \dots, n$$

- Random coefficient model

- Estimated skill measures:

$$\hat{m}_i = \{\hat{a}_i, \hat{b}_i, \hat{a}_i \bar{q}_{1,i} - \hat{b}_i \bar{q}_{2,i}, \hat{a}_i \bar{q}_{1,i} - \hat{b}_i (\bar{q}_{1,i})^2\}$$

- Fund selection ( $I_i=1$  if fund  $i$  is selected)

- Rule 1: minimum number of observations T (60)
- Rule 2: condition number on covariance mat. (15)

# The Non-Parametric Approach

## 2) Standard non-parametric estimator

- Density estimator at a given point  $m$  (Silverman(86))

$$\hat{\varphi}(m) = \frac{1}{nh} \sum_{i=1}^n I_i K\left(\frac{\hat{m}_i - m}{h}\right)$$

where  $K$  is the Kernel function (Gaussian)

$h$  is the bandwidth

- **Prop. 1:** properties of  $\hat{\varphi}(m)$  ( $n, T \rightarrow \infty, h \rightarrow 0$ )

$$\sqrt{nh}(\hat{\varphi}(m) - \varphi(m) - bs(m)) = N(0, K_1 \varphi(m))$$

where  $K_1$  is a constant ( $K_1 = \int K(u)^2 du$ )

$bs$  is the bias term

# The Non-Parametric Approach

- **Key insights from Proposition 1**
  - $\hat{\varphi}(m)$  is asymptotically normally distributed
  - Help with the choice of the optimal bandwidth
    - If  $T$  small wrt  $n$ : we have  $h^* \propto (n/T)^{-1/3}$
  - The bias term  $bs$  has two components
    - (i) Smoothing bias  $bs_1$  (standard)
    - (ii) Error in variable (EIV) bias  $bs_2$  (non-standard)
      - Both terms depend on the *true* density  $\varphi(\alpha)$

# The Non-Parametric Approach

## 3) Adjustment for the bias

- Use a reference model to estimate the bias  $bs$

$$m_i \sim N(\mu_m, \sigma_m) \text{ and } s_i \sim N(\mu_s, \sigma_s) \text{ with correl } \rho$$

$$\text{where } s_i = \log(S_i)$$

$S_i$  is the asymptotic variance of  $\sqrt{T}\hat{m}_i$

- **Prop. 2:** bias under the ref. model (as  $n, T \rightarrow \infty, h \rightarrow 0$ )

(i) Smoothing bias:  $bs^{r_1}(m) = f(\mu_m, \sigma_m) \phi\left(\frac{m - \mu_m}{\sigma_m}\right)$

(ii) EIV bias:  $bs^{r_2}(m) = f(\mu_m, \sigma_m, \mu_s, \sigma_s, \rho) \phi\left(\frac{m - \mu_m - \rho\sigma_m\sigma_s}{\sigma_m}\right)$



# The Non-Parametric Approach

- **Key insights from Proposition 2**
  - Offer several advantages:
    - Simple to compute
    - Estimation precision (5 parameters)
    - Closed form: comparative static analysis
  - One thing to check:
    - Accuracy when the reference model does not hold?
    - Checked it is the case with Monte-Carlo analysis

# The Non-Parametric Approach

## 4) Bias-adjusted density estimator


- Estimate the five moments of the reference model
  - From the estimated skill measures
  - From the estimated variance (Newey-West)
- Compute the bias terms using Prop. 2
- Bias-adjusted density estimator

$$\hat{\varphi}^*(m) = \hat{\varphi}(m) - \widehat{bs}^r(m)$$

# The Non-Parametric Approach


## Bias components for first dollar alpha

Smoothing bias



Play no role given the large number of funds  $n$  (more than 2,200)

EIV bias



Bias is massive

Intuition:  $\hat{a} = a + \text{estimation noise}$   
overestimate prob. of observing large  $a$

Shape is general as long as *true* density peaks at the mean

# Data Description

- **Mutual funds**

- All open-end, actively-managed US equity funds
- Monthly return data from CRSP
- Gross returns computed by value-weighting the different shareclasses
- Exclusion of funds with \$15 mio.
  - Chen et al.(04), Pastor, Stambaugh, Taylor(15)
- Sample period: January 1979 - December 2015

# Data Description

- **Benchmark models**

- Four-factor models

- Market, size, value, momentum

- Cremers Petajisto, Zitzewitz (CPZ) version

- Market is the SP500

- Size, value obtained from Russell indices

- Rationale for CPZ model over Carhart model

- Carhart model fails to price the Russell indices

- Ann. alpha of -2.4% for Russell 2000 (over 85-05)

# Data Description

- **Summary Statistics (value-weighted portfolio)**

**Panel A: Gross Excess Return**

	Average Nb. Funds	Mean (Ann.)	Volatility (Ann.)	Skewness	Kurtosis
<b>All Funds</b>	1103	7.68	15.01	-0.8	5.4

**Panel B: Estimated Betas**

	Market	Size	Value	Momentum	Adj. R2
<b>All Funds</b>	0.93	0.26	-0.10	0.01	0.98
<b>Investment Styles</b>					
Small-cap	0.98	0.81	-0.29	0.05	0.97
Large-cap	0.94	0.15	-0.06	0.01	0.99
Growth	0.95	0.33	-0.27	0.03	0.97
Value	0.92	0.13	0.19	-0.01	0.98
<b>Fund Characteristics</b>					
Low Expense	0.92	0.21	-0.04	0.00	0.98
High Expense	0.93	0.42	-0.27	0.01	0.97
Low Turnover	0.91	0.20	0.04	-0.02	0.98
High Turnover	0.95	0.37	-0.28	0.08	0.97

# Empirical Results

- ***First skill dimension: First-Dollar Alpha***

	Moments				Proportions (%)		Quantiles (Ann.)	
	Mean (Ann.)	Volatility (Ann.)	Skewness	Kurtosis	Negative Skill	Positive Skill	10%	90%
<b>All Funds</b>	3.5	3.6	6.2	5.8	12.5	87.5	-0.4	7.8
<b>Investment Styles</b>								
Small-cap	5.1	3.4	10.5	1.5	4.6	95.4	1.2	9.7
Large-cap	2.0	2.4	5.9	3.9	17.7	82.3	-0.8	4.9
Growth	3.6	4.1	5.6	5.1	15.5	84.5	-0.8	8.5
Value	3.4	3.8	6.4	4.3	15.3	84.7	-0.6	8.4
<b>Fund Characteristics</b>								
Low Expense	2.2	3.5	5.0	6.4	23.4	76.6	-1.7	6.1
High Expense	4.6	4.3	5.9	3.1	12.0	88.0	-0.4	9.9
Low Turnover	3.3	4.0	5.1	4.8	16.0	84.0	-0.9	8.2
High Turnover	3.8	5.0	5.5	5.4	17.2	82.8	-1.2	9.2

# Empirical Results

- ***Second skill dimension: Size Coefficient***

	Moments				Proportions (%)		Quantiles (Ann.)	
	Mean (Ann.)	Volatility (Ann.)	Skewness	Kurtosis	Negative Skill	Positive Skill	10%	90%
<b>All Funds</b>	1.5	1.5	8.1	7.2	14.1	85.9	-0.2	3.4
<b>Investment Styles</b>								
Small-cap	2.0	1.5	8.2	3.7	9.1	90.9	0.1	4.1
Large-cap	1.0	1.0	7.4	2.7	17.1	82.9	-0.3	2.3
Growth	1.6	1.8	7.1	4.9	17.1	82.9	-0.5	3.9
Value	1.4	1.5	7.2	4.7	18.0	82.0	-0.4	3.3
<b>Fund Characteristics</b>								
Low Expense	0.9	1.3	2.9	13.2	24.4	75.6	-0.6	2.4
High Expense	1.9	2.0	7.8	4.1	14.5	85.5	-0.3	4.3
Low Turnover	1.3	1.7	3.7	8.0	19.8	80.2	-0.6	3.3
High Turnover	1.7	2.2	4.6	5.7	18.5	81.5	-0.7	4.2




# Empirical Results

- ***The two skill dimensions***
  - In short:
    - Strong evidence of investment skills
    - Strong evidence of capacity constraints
    - Large heterogeneity
    - Highly non-normal skill distributions
  - In addition:
    - The two skill measures are positively correlated  
High  $\alpha$  comes with high size coefficient
    - Aggregation of the two dimensions is necessary to measure overall skill level

# Empirical Results


- ***First Dollar Alpha***
  - Small cap versus large cap funds



# Empirical Results

- ***Size Coefficient***

- Small cap versus large cap funds



# Empirical Results

- ***Aggregating skill: the value added (lifecycle)***

Panel A: Lifecycle Value Added

	Moments				Proportions (%)		Quantiles (Ann.)	
	Mean (Ann.)	Volatility (Ann.)	Skewness	Kurtosis	Negative Skill	Positive Skill	10%	90%
<b>All Funds</b>	1.9	9.3	8.8	14.5	35.9	64.1	-2.3	11.1
<b>Investment Styles</b>								
Small-cap	4.1	11.6	9.8	19.9	34.8	65.2	-2.9	15.4
Large-cap	0.0	7.8	5.5	8.8	47.8	52.2	-3.1	5.2
Growth	2.3	11.3	10.5	16.8	38.0	62.0	-3.4	14.0
Value	1.5	11.9	2.1	6.1	41.5	58.5	-3.4	8.9
<b>Fund Characteristics</b>								
Low Expense	5.5	21.2	9.8	9.2	30.8	69.2	-2.5	31.1
High Expense	1.3	7.7	1.6	6.7	39.7	60.3	-2.9	6.9
Low Turnover	5.8	19.1	8.9	2.5	12.4	87.6	-0.2	26.4
High Turnover	1.0	13.3	4.2	7.8	44.9	55.1	-5.9	10.9

# Empirical Results

- ***Aggregating skill: the value added (steady state)***

Panel B: Steady State Value Added

	Moments				Proportions (%)		Quantiles (Ann.)	
	Mean (Ann.)	Volatility (Ann.)	Skewness	Kurtosis	Negative Skill	Positive Skill	10%	90%
<b>All Funds</b>	7.1	15.1	9.6	21.5	27.3	72.7	-1.7	25.6
<b>Investment Styles</b>								
Small-cap	8.4	14.2	8.0	13.7	17.8	82.2	-1.3	24.3
Large-cap	4.9	12.1	11.7	24.4	31.7	68.3	-1.6	21.0
Growth	8.8	19.4	10.1	20.8	29.2	70.8	-2.3	33.9
Value	6.7	14.3	7.0	10.8	24.7	75.3	-1.5	25.4
<b>Fund Characteristics</b>								
Low Expense	10.3	30.8	8.3	16.2	32.5	67.5	-3.1	44.4
High Expense	5.5	10.3	9.0	13.5	23.0	77.0	-1.5	19.9
Low Turnover	12.9	28.5	8.5	12.9	16.5	83.5	-0.8	51.2
High Turnover	6.0	13.8	8.2	9.4	26.5	73.5	-2.1	23.0

# Empirical Results

- ***Aggregating skill: optimal value added***

- Key prediction of neoclassical BG model:

- Funds optimize their value added

- Optimal value added:

$$va_i^* = \frac{(a_i)^2}{4b_i}$$

- We can apply the non-parametric approach

- Estimate the distribution of the optimal value added

- Test the prediction of the model

# Empirical Results

- ***Aggregating skill: optimal value added***

	Mean (Ann.)			Abs. Difference		Rel. Difference (%)	
	Optimal	Value Added Lifecycle	Value Added Steady State	Value Added Lifecycle	Value Added Steady State	Value Added Lifecycle	Value Added Steady State
<b>All Funds</b>	13.4	1.3	9.0	12.2	4.5	9.5	66.8
<b>Investment Styles</b>							
Small-cap	12.7	3.1	9.1	9.6	3.6	24.2	71.5
Large-cap	12.7	-0.8	6.9	13.4	5.8	-6.2	54.3
<b>Fund Characteristics</b>							
Growth	15.0	0.9	11.0	14.1	4.1	6.1	73.0
Value	14.3	0.9	9.2	13.4	5.1	6.1	64.1
Low Expense	23.5	4.9	14.7	18.6	8.8	20.8	62.6
High Expense	10.4	0.6	6.9	9.8	3.5	5.6	66.6
Low Turnover	27.3	4.8	16.7	22.5	10.6	17.7	61.3
High Turnover	14.2	-0.9	7.6	15.1	6.6	-6.3	53.7

# Empirical Results

- ***The value added***
  - In short:
    - Funds generate substantial profits
    - Large heterogeneity
    - Highly non-normal skill distributions
  - In addition:
    - Profits are not far from optimal levels once funds reach their average size
    - Consistent with prediction of the neoclassical BG model



# The Skill Measures

- *Quid gross alpha?*
  - Widely used as a skill measure in previous work
  - Issue: it does not control for differences in size
    - Fund 1 more skilled than fund 2 on all dimensions...  
Yet they could have the same alphas if  $\text{size } 1 > \text{size } 2$
  - Neoclassical theory: gross alpha=fees  
So gross alpha related to skill  $(a_i, b_i, v a_i)$  only if funds choose specific fees (i.e., specific fund sizes)

# The Skill Measures

- ***Quid gross alpha?***
  - Empirically, we find that this is not the case
    - Funds like to operate at a larger size
    - Thus, some of them charge “low” fees
  - This implies that the gross alpha is not very informative about skill
    - Moderate correlation with fd alpha
    - Zero correlation with size coefficient
    - Zero correlation with value added


# Conclusion

- **In this paper, we examine mutual fund skill**
  - Four measures (skill dimensions + value added)
- **We apply a novel non-parametric approach**
  - No parametric specification + joint skill measurement
- **Overall results**
  - Managers are skilled at detecting profitable trades...  
but unskilled at overriding capacity constraints
  - Overall, the fund profits from exploiting skill are large  
and close to the optimal level in the long run
  - Funds have skills and bargaining power

# Additional Material


## Comparative static analysis

Change in volatility  $\sigma_\alpha$   
of  $\alpha$  (+/- 30%)



Intuition:  $\sigma_\alpha$  increases  
rel. importance of  $\alpha$   
over noise increases

Change in average  
variance  $\sigma_s$  of  $\hat{\alpha}$  (+/- 30%)



Intuition:  $\sigma_s$  increases  
rel. importance of  
noise over  $\alpha$  increases

# Additional Material

- **Relations between the skill measures**
  - Neoclassical model of Berk and Green (2004)
    - (i) skilled managers maximize profits
    - (ii) investors compete for performance ( $\alpha = \text{fees}(fe)$ )
  - Total revenue ( $r_i$ ):  $a_i q_i$
  - Total cost ( $c_i$ ):  $b_i (q_i)^2$
  - Optimal size:  $q_i^* = a_i / 2b_i$  obtained with  $\text{fees} = fe^*$
  - Value added or total profits ( $va_i$ ):

$$r_i^* - c_i^* = a_i q_i^* - b_i (q_i^*)^2 = (a_i)^2 / 4b_i$$

# Additional Material


- Key insight from the model: fees are irrelevant
  - Low fees: additional flows  $q_i - q_i^*$  are passively indexed so that  $r_i^* - c_i^*$  is unchanged
  - High fees: sell index short and invest the proceeds  $q_i^* - q_i$  in the fund so that  $r_i^* - c_i^*$  is unchanged
- However, fees affect the fund size and thus the relations between skill measures
- Let us look at four different compensation schemes

# Additional Material


Compensation Scheme	Scheme I	Scheme II	Scheme III	Scheme IV
Managers set fees such that	The size is optimal $q_i^*$	The size is optimal <sup>2</sup> $(q_i^*)^2$	The size is the same $q$	The size is arbitrary $q_i^a$
Gross alpha	$(r_i^* - c_i^*)/q_i^* = a_i/2$	$(r_i^* - c_i^*)/(q_i^*)^2 = b_i$	$(r_i^* - c_i^*)/q = (a_i)^2/4qb_i$	$(r_i^* - c_i^*)/q_i^a = (a_i)^2/4q_i^a b_i$
Does the Gross Alpha Measure Skill?	YES	YES	YES	NO
	First-Dollar Alpha (1st dimension)	Size Coefficient (2nd dimension)	Value Added	
Predictions for Size/Fees	Moderate cross-fund variation in fees/size	Huge size Tiny fees	Same Size for all funds	Large cross-fund variation in size

# Additional Material

**Manager 1**  
(choose low fees= $fe$ )



**Manager 2**  
(same as manager 1 ( $fe$ ))



Fees are low, so money flows until size  $q$  is reached:

$\alpha = fe$

$q^*$  is actively managed

$q - q^*$  is passively managed

Here again, we have  $\alpha = fe$   
But this condition is achieved at a smaller size  $q^*$